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Nominal Debt as a Burden on Monetary Policy* 
We characterize the optimal sequential choice of monetary policy in 
economies with either nominal or indexed debt. In a model where nominal 
debt is the only source of time inconsistency, the Markov-perfect equilibrium 
policy implies the progressive depletion of the outstanding stock of debt, until 
the time inconsistency disappears. There is a resulting welfare loss if debt is 
nominal rather than indexed. We also analyze the case where monetary policy 
is time inconsistent even when debt is indexed. In this case, with nominal 
debt, the sequential optimal policy converges to a time-consistent steady state 
with positive -- or negative -- debt, depending on the value of the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution. Welfare can be higher if debt is nominal rather than 
indexed and the level of debt is not too high. 
JEL Classification: E40, E50, E58 and E60 
Keywords: indexed debt, Markov-perfect equilibrium, nominal debt, optimal 
monetary policy and time consistency 
Javier Díaz-Giménez 
Department of Economics  
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid   
Calle Madrid 126   
28903 Getafe   
Madrid   
SPAIN   
Email: kueli@eco.uc3m.es   
 
For further Discussion Papers by this author see: 
www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=118347 
Giorgia Giovannetti 
University of Firenze, 
Dpt of Economics, 
Via delle Pandette 
50127 Firenze 
ITALY   
Email: giorgia.giovannetti@unifi.it 
 
 
For further Discussion Papers by this author see: 
www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=106706 
Ramon Marimon 
European University Institute (EUI)   
Villa la Fonte   
Via delle Fontanelle 20   
I - 50016 San Domenico di Fiesole.   
ITALY   
Email: ramon.marimon@eui.eu   
 
 
For further Discussion Papers by this author see: 
www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=113196 
 
Pedro Teles 
Departamento de Estudos 
Economicos  
Banco de Portugal   
R, Francisco Ribeiro, n. 2   
P-1150 Lisboa   
PORTUGAL   
Email: pteles@fcee.ucp.pt   
 
For further Discussion Papers by this author see: 
www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=115738 
 
* We thank the editor, Narayana Kocherlakota, and two anonymous referees 
for very useful comments and suggestions. We also thank Isabel Correia and 
Juan Pablo Nicolini for their comments, as well as the participants in seminars 
and conferences where this work has been presented. Financial support of the 
Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y TecnologÍa (Grants: SEC2002-004318), FIRB 
(Grant RBNE03YT7Z-006) and the Fundação de Ciência e Tecnologia of 
Portugal is also acknowledged. 
 
 
Submitted 27 November 2007 
 
1 Introduction
Fiscal discipline has often been seen as a precondition for price stability. Such is, for
example, the rationale behind the Growth and Stability Pact in Europe. The underlying
policy debate shows the concern regarding a time-inconsistency problem associated with
high levels of nominal debt that could be monetized. In this paper we analyze the
implications for the optimal sequential design of monetary policy when public debt is
nominal and when it is indexed. We characterize the optimal sequential policy choices
with both nominal and indexed debt and assess the relative performance of the two in
terms of welfare.
The model is a cash-in-advance production economy where agents start the period
with predetermined money balances, which are used for transactions during the period,
as in Svensson (1985). The government’s problem is to finance exogenous government
expenditures in the least distortionary manner. In this economy, an increase in the price
level decreases the real value of outstanding money and nominal debt and therefore
reduces the need for distortionary taxation. However, this also induces a fall in present
consumption because of the cash-in-advance constraint. As shown by Nicolini (1998),
who analyzes the same class of economies, the incentives to inflate, or deflate, depend
on preferences and on whether debt is nominal or real.
If debt is indexed, the decision on whether to use the inflation tax, to tax today or
tomorrow, hinges on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. If the elasticity is one
then it is equal to the implicit elasticity of the cash-in-advance constraint and the optimal
plan is time consistent. However, with nominal debt, there is a reason to monetize the
debt, and the optimal policy plan is no longer time consistent. We show that in a
Markov-perfect equilibrium path the debt is asymptotically depleted, and therefore the
path for the nominal interest rate is decreasing. In this case of unitary elasticity, the fact
that debt is nominal rather than indexed introduces a dynamic distortion that lowers
welfare unambiguously.
For the general case of non unitary elasticity, the optimal policy plan is time incon-
sistent even with indexed debt. Optimal taxation principles dictate whether current or
future consumption should be taxed more. In particular, if the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution is higher than one – that is, higher than the implicit elasticity of the
cash-in-advance constraint – it is efficient to tax more current consumption; along a
sequentially optimal path, indexed debt is depleted all the way to the first best, where
it is negative and large enough in absolute value to finance all expenditures without the
need to collect distortionary taxes. If the intertemporal elasticity is, instead, lower than
one, future consumption is taxed more and debt increases asymptotically.
With nominal debt, the incentives to inflate when debt is positive can compensate
the incentives to deflate when the intertemporal elasticity is lower than one. Similarly,
the incentives to deflate when debt is negative can compensate the incentives to inflate
when the intertemporal elasticity is higher than one. At the debt level where these
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conflicting incentives cancel out there is a steady state. This stationary level of debt is
negative for elasticity higher than one, and positive for elasticity lower than one. For
different levels of initial debt, optimal sequential paths of nominal debt converge to this
steady state.
When the elasticity is different from one, in contrast with the unitary elasticity case,
nominal debt solves – in the long-run – a time-inconsistency problem present in the
indexed-debt case; in particular, if the elasticity is higher than one, there is no need
to accumulate so many assets in order to achieve the first best, as in the indexed-debt
case; if the elasticity is lower than one, debt does not increase asymptotically.
A central contribution of this paper is the welfare comparison of the two regimes,
nominal or indexed debt. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is one, indexed
debt unambiguously dominates nominal debt in terms of welfare. In contrast, if the
elasticity is non-unitary, the fact that the incentive to monetize the debt can compensate
the distortions present with indexed debt can result in nominal debt dominating indexed
debt. In particular, as our computations show – when debt is relatively low – nominal
debt can be a blessing, rather than a burden, to monetary policy.
Related work includes Calvo (1988), Obstfeld (1997), Nicolini (1998), Ellison and
Rankin (2007), Martin (2006), Persson, Persson and Svensson (2006), and Reis (2006).
Calvo (1988) addressed the question of the relative performance of nominal versus in-
dexed debt, considering a reduced form model with two periods, where nominal debt
creates a time inconsistency. There is an ad-hoc cost of taxation and an ad-hoc cost
of repudiation that depends on the volume of debt. The focus of Calvo (1998) is on
multiple equilibria, which result from his assumption on repudiation costs. With such
a model, it is not possible to understand how debt, either nominal or indexed, can
be used as a state variable affecting future monetary policy; how optimal equilibrium
paths should evolve, or why different welfare rankings of indexed versus nominal debts
are possible.
Obstfeld (1997) and Ellison and Rankin (2007) assume that debt is real, and focus on
monetary policy. They compute Markov-perfect equilibria when the source of the time
inconsistency of monetary policy is related to the depletion of the real value of money
balances. Obstfeld (1997) uses a model where money balances are not predetermined
and therefore must consider an ad-hoc cost of a surprise inflation. Ellison and Rankin
(2007) use the model in Nicolini (1998) with a class of preferences for which the level of
real debt matters for the direction of the time inconsistency problem.
Martin (2006) studies a version of the same model we analyze, in which the govern-
ment only issues nominal debt, not indexed. He provides an analytical characterization
of the long-run behavior of Markov-perfect equilibria in the case of nominal debt, and
shows that the long-run behavior depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion. Our paper analyzes and contrasts both types of debt regimes, providing a numerical
comparison of Markov-perfect equilibrium outcomes, characterizing the equilibria and
comparing the indexed and nominal debt regimes in terms of welfare.
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A different strand of related literature studies how optimal policies under commit-
ment can be made time consistent by properly managing the portfolio of government
assets and liabilities. The closest paper to ours in this literature is Persson, Persson and
Svensson (2006)1. They use a structure similar to Nicolini (1998) and assume that the
government can use both nominal and real debt as well as that there are no restrictions
on debt being positive or negative.
Although we use as benchmark economies with full commitment, our main focus
is on Markov-perfect equilibria. In fact, the full characterization and computation of
the optimal policy in such equilibria – with debt as a state variable – is an additional
contribution of our work.2
Finally, there is a recent related literature on the characterization of the best sustain-
able equilibrium in similar optimal taxation problems, which also reaches the conclusion
that optimal policies should, asymptotically, eliminate time inconsistency distortions
(see, for example, Reis, 2006).
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we describe the model economy and
define competitive equilibria with nominal and indexed debt. In Section 3, we char-
acterize the optimal allocations and policies under commitment, for the purpose of
understanding the sources of time inconsistency. In Section 4, we analyze and compute
the Markov-perfect equilibria with indexed and nominal debt. Section 5 contains the
main results of the paper: we compare the different regimes in terms of welfare. Finally
in Section 6, we show that considering alternative taxes does not change the analysis,
as long as taxes are set one period in advance.
2 The model economy
In this section we describe the model economy with nominal debt. We follow very
closely the structure in Nicolini (1998). The economy is a production economy with
linear technology,
ct + g ≤ nt (1)
for every t ≥ 0, where ct and g are private and public consumption, respectively and nt
is labor. There is a representative household and a government. The preferences of the
household are assumed to be linear in leisure and isoelastic in consumption,
∞∑
t=0
βt[u(ct)− αnt], (2)
1See also Alvarez, Kehoe and Neumeyer (2004) and Lucas and Stokey (1983).
2In this respect, our work is closely related to Krusell, Mart´ın and R´ıos-Rull (2003), who characterize
the recursive equilibria that obtain in an optimal labor taxation problem, and other more recent work
on Markov-perfect equilibria.
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where u(c) = (c)
1−σ−1
1−σ . 0 < β < 1 is the time discount factor.
We assume that consumption in period t must be purchased using currency carried
over from period t − 1 as in Svensson (1985). This timing of transactions implies that
the representative household takes initial money balances M0 and nominal public debt
holdings B0(1+i0) as given. A price increase is costly since it reduces consumption. The
specific form of the cash-in-advance constraint faced by the representative household is:
Ptct ≤Mt (3)
for every t ≥ 0, where Pt is the price of one unit of the date t consumption good in units
of money and Mt are money balances acquired in period t−1 and used for consumption
in period t.
In each period the representative household faces the following budget constraint:
Mt+1 +Bt+1 ≤Mt − Ptct +Bt(1 + it) + Ptnt (4)
where Mt+1 and Bt+1 denote, respectively, money and nominal government debt that
the household carries over from period t to period t + 1, and it is the nominal interest
rate on government debt held from period t − 1 to t . The representative household
faces a no-Ponzi games condition:
lim
T−→∞
βT
BT+1
PT
≥ 0 (5)
In each period t ≥ 0, the government issues currency M gt+1 and nominal debt Bgt+1,
to finance an exogenous and constant level of public consumption g.3 Initially, we
abstract from any other source of public revenues. The sequence of government budget
constraints is
M gt+1 +B
g
t+1 ≥M gt +Bgt (1 + it) + Ptg, t ≥ 0, (6)
together with the no-Ponzi games condition limT−→∞ β
T B
g
T+1
PT
≤ 0. The initial stock of
currency, M g0 , and initial debt liabilities, B
g
0(1 + i0), are given. A government policy is,
therefore, a specification of {M gt+1, Bgt+1} for t ≥ 0.
2.1 A competitive equilibrium with nominal debt
Definition 1 A competitive equilibrium for an economy with nominal debt is a govern-
ment policy, {M gt+1, Bgt+1}∞t=0, an allocation {Mt+1, Bt+1, ct, nt}∞t=0, and a price vector,
{Pt, it+1}∞t=0, such that:
3We assume that government expenditures, g, are given, although our analysis can easily be extended
to the case of endogenous government expenditures.
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(i) given M g0 and B
g
0(1+ i0), and g, the government policy and the price vector satisfy
the government budget constraint described in expression (6) together with a no-
Ponzi games condition;
(ii) when households take M0, B0(1 + i0) and the price vector as given, the allocation
maximizes utility (2), subject to the cash-in-advance constraint (3), the household
budget constraint (4), and the no-Ponzi games condition (5); and
(iii) all markets clear, that is: M gt+1 = Mt+1, B
g
t+1 = Bt+1, and g and {ct, nt}∞t=0 satisfy
the economy’s resource constraint (1), for every t ≥ 0.
Given our assumptions on the utility of consumption u, it is straightforward to show
that the competitive equilibrium allocation of this economy satisfies both the economy’s
resource constraint (1) and the household’s budget constraint (4) with equality, and
that the first order conditions of the Lagrangian of the household’s problem are both
necessary and sufficient to characterize the solution to the household’s problem. The
cash-in-advance constraint (3) is binding for t ≥ 0 if uc(ct)
α
> 1. This condition is
satisfied for t ≥ 1 whenever it > 0, since uc(ct)α = 1 + it for t ≥ 1. For the first-best
consumption level, where uc(ct)
α
= 1, the cash-in-advance constraint does not have to
hold with equality.
The competitive equilibrium of an economy with nominal debt can be characterized
by the following conditions that must hold for every t ≥ 0:
uc(ct+1)
α
= 1 + it+1, t ≥ 0, (7)
1 + it+1 = β
−1Pt+1
Pt
, t ≥ 0, (8)
and the cash-in-advance constraint, which, if uc(ct)
α
> 1, t ≥ 0, must hold with equality4
ct =
Mt
Pt
, t ≥ 0. (9)
Furthermore, the following equilibrium conditions must also be satisfied: the govern-
ment budget constraint (6), the resource constraint (1) with equality, and the transver-
sality condition
lim
T−→∞
βT
(
MT+1 +BT+1
PT
)
= 0 (10)
implied by optimality given the no-Ponzi games condition (5).
4Let µt be the multiplier of the cash-in-advance constraint (3). At the optimum, β
t (uc (ct)− α) =
µtPt, t ≥ 0. Therefore, µt > 0 as long as uc (ct) /α > 1.
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2.2 An economy with indexed debt
An economy with indexed debt is an economy in all identical to the economy with nominal
debt except far government assets. The nominal interest rate adjusts with the price level
so that Bt(1+it)
Pt
≡ bt is now predetermined for every period t ≥ 0. The intertemporal
budget constraint of the household can then be written as
Mt+1 +
bt+1
1 + it+1
Pt+1 ≤Mt − Ptct + btPt + Ptnt.
The first order conditions (7)-(9) are also first order conditions of the optimal problem
with indexed debt.
A competitive equilibrium for an economy with indexed debt is defined as a gov-
ernment policy, {M gt+1, bgt+1}∞t=0, an allocation {Mt+1, bt+1, ct, nt}∞t=0, and a price vector,
{Pt, it+1}∞t=0, such that the conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) of Definition 1 are satisfied when
nominal liabilities are replaced by real liabilities, according to Bt(1+it)
Pt
= bt, where bt is
predetermined.
2.3 Implementability with nominal debt
When choosing its policy the government takes into account the above equilibrium
conditions. These conditions can be summarized with implementability conditions in
terms of the allocations. In particular, as long as the cash-in-advance constraint is
binding, the government budget constraint (6), which is satisfied with equality, can be
written as the implementability condition
ct+1uc(ct+1)
β
α
+ βzt+1ct+1 = ct + ztct + g, t ≥ 0 (11)
where
zt ≡ B
g
t (1 + it)
M gt
.
To see this, notice that the budget constraint (6) with equality can be written in
real terms as
M gt+1
Pt
+
Bgt+1
Pt
=
M gt
Pt
+
Bgt (1 + it)
Pt
+ g (12)
and, using the first order conditions of the household problem, (7), (8) and (9), as well
as the cash-in-advance constraint with equality,
Mgt
Pt
= ct, one obtains the following
identities:
Mgt+1
Pt
=
Mgt+1
Pt+1
Pt+1
Pt
= ct+1β(1 + it+1) = ct+1uc(ct+1)
β
α
;
Bgt (1+it)
Pt
=
Bgt (1+it)
Mgt
Mgt
Pt
=
ztct, and
Bgt+1
Pt
=
Bgt+1(1+it+1)
Mgt+1
Mgt+1/Pt+1
Pt(1+it+1)/Pt+1
= βzt+1ct+1.
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The intertemporal implementability condition (11) together with the terminal con-
dition limT−→∞ β
T (cT+1uc(cT+1)
β
α
+ βzT+1cT+1) = 0, obtained from the transversality
condition (10), summarize the equilibrium conditions if the cash-in-advance constraint
is always binding. Notice that the remaining equilibrium conditions are satisfied since
equilibrium interest rates, prices, nominal liabilities and labor supplies can be derived
from the competitive equilibrium restrictions; that is {it+1}∞t=0 satisfying (7), {Pt+1}∞t=0
satisfying (8), {Mt+1}∞t=0 and P0 that satisfy (9), {nt}∞t=0 satisfying (1), and {Bt+1}∞t=0
so that zt+1 =
Bt+1(1+it+1)
Mt+1
.
Using the terminal condition, the present value government budget constraint takes
the form
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ct+1uc(ct+1)
β
α
− (ct + g)
)
= z0c0 (13)
2.4 Implementability with indexed debt
With indexed debt, the government budget constraint (6 ) with equality can be written
as the implementability condition
ct+1uc(ct+1)
β
α
+ βbt+1 = ct + bt + g, t ≥ 0, (14)
provided the cash-in-advance constraint binds. The transversality condition (10) is
written as limT−→∞ β
T (cT+1uc(cT+1)
β
α
+ βbT+1) = 0, which implies that the present
value government budget constraint takes the form
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ct+1uc(ct+1)
β
α
− (ct + g)
)
= b0. (15)
This condition summarizes, when debt is indexed, the competitive equilibrium re-
strictions on the sequence of consumption {ct}∞t=0. The only difference between the
implementability conditions with nominal and indexed debt is in the right hand side of
equations (13) and (15). With nominal debt, the government can affect the real value
of outstanding debt, although this necessarily affects consumption.
Notice also that an economy with nominal debt, and initial nominal liabilities z0,
where the government policy results in a choice of c0 has the same period zero, ex-post,
real liabilities as an indexed economy with initial –but, predetermined – real liabilities
b0 = z0c0. We use this correspondence in comparing economies with nominal debt with
economies with real debt.
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3 Optimal policy with full commitment
In this section we compare optimal policies under full commitment when debt is indexed
and when it is nominal. This is useful because, by observing how the optimal allocations
differ in the initial period from subsequent ones, we are able to understand whether
policy is time consistent, and when it is not, what is the source of the time inconsistency.
In defining a full commitment Ramsey equilibrium with indexed debt, we assume – and,
ex-post confirm – that the solution of the problem satisfies u
′(ct)
α
> 1, t ≥ 0, so that the
cash-in-advance constraint always binds5.
Definition 2 A full commitment Ramsey equilibrium with indexed debt is a
competitive equilibrium such that {ct} solves the following problem:
Max
∞∑
t=0
βt [u(ct)− α(ct + g)] (16)
subject to the implementability condition (15):
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ct+1uc(ct+1)
β
α
− (ct + g)
)
= b0.
The other competitive equilibrium variables, which are the government policy {M gt+1,
Bgt+1}∞t=0, the allocation {Mt+1, Bt+1, nt}∞t=0, and the price vector {Pt, it+1}∞t=0, are ob-
tained using the competitive equilibrium conditions.
The optimal solution with commitment results in a constant consumption path from
period one on, ct+1 = c1, t ≥ 0. The intertemporal condition relating the optimal
consumption in the initial period to the optimal stationary consumption in subsequent
periods is
uc(c0)− α = uc(c1)− α
1− uc(c1)
α
(1− σ) . (17)
Clearly, when σ = 1, the two consumptions are equal and the solution is time
consistent. When σ < 1, (i.e., the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 1/σ > 1)
the government prefers to tax more current consumption than future consumption, and
therefore c0 < c1. When σ > 1, the government prefers to delay taxation and c0 > c1.
In summary, when σ 6= 1, the full commitment solution is time-inconsistent due to
‘intertemporal elasticity effects.’
In the definition of a full-commitment Ramsey equilibrium, we have imposed a bind-
ing cash-in-advance constraint in all periods. When σ ≥ 1 (i.e., uc(c1) ≥ uc(c0)), the
5See Appendix 1 for a discussion of equilibria with first-best outcomes and with non-binding cash-
in-advance constraints.
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cash-in-advance constraint binds as long as there is a need to raise distortionary taxes.
When σ < 1 (i.e., uc(c1) < uc(c0)), the cash-in-advance constraint binds as long as it is
not possible to attain the first best from period t = 1 on6.
Definition 3 A full commitment Ramsey equilibrium with nominal debt is a
competitive equilibrium such that {ct} solves the following problem:
Max
∞∑
t=0
βt [u(ct)− α(ct + g)] (18)
subject to the implementability condition (13):
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ct+1uc(ct+1)
β
α
− (ct + g)
)
= z0c0. (19)
As in economies with indexed debt, it is optimal for the government to commit to
a constant path of consumption (and nominal interest rates) from period one on, but
consumption in period zero may differ. With nominal debt, the intertemporal condition
relating consumption in period zero and period one is given by
uc(c0)− α
1 + z0
=
uc(c1)− α
1− uc(c1)
α
(1− σ) . (20)
This condition makes explicit the additional motive for consumption in the two peri-
ods to diverge when debt is nominal. Comparing (20) with the intertemporal condition
with indexed debt (17), it can be seen that, as long as z0 ≡ B0(1+i0)M0 > 0, c0 is relatively
smaller – with respect to c1 – than the corresponding c0 of the economy with indexed
debt. In other words, the incentive to monetize debt always results in relatively lower
period zero consumption; whether this results in lower consumption in the initial period
with respect to future consumption depends on how this effect interacts with the ’in-
tertemporal elasticity’ effect already present in the indexed economy. As in economies
with indexed debt, the government commits to a constant path of consumption (i.e.
of nominal interest rates) from period one on, but consumption in period zero may be
different, due to the ‘intertemporal elasticity effect’ (as in the indexed debt case) or to
the ‘nominal effect’ of monetizing nominal debts and revaluing nominal assets.
A closer inspection of (20) also shows that for every σ there is a z0 resulting in a
constant optimal consumption path from period zero on, and therefore policy is time
consistent. Such z0 is obtained by solving for c, the following steady state implementabil-
ity condition: cuc(c)
β
α
+βz0c = (1 + z0) c+ g. That is, substituting z0 = −uc(c)α (1− σ) ,
the steady state equation reduces to cuc(c)
α
[1− (1− β)σ] = c+ g. Therefore, as long as
6See Appendix 1.
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(1− β)σ < 1, there is a solution for c and, correspondingly, for z0. Notice that z0 is
negative, zero or positive, depending on whether σ < 1, σ = 1 or σ > 17
In summary, in our economies, with full commitment, it is optimal to set the same
inflation tax rate from period one on, resulting in a stationary consumption path start-
ing from that period. With a unitary intertemporal elasticity of substitution (log util-
ity), the optimal policy with indexed debt is time consistent (Nicolini, 1998). The
time-consistency is lost for those same preferences if debt is nominal, since there is an
additional reason to inflate in the initial period: to reduce the real value of outstanding
nominal liabilities. Under more general preferences, there is a time inconsistency even
when debt is indexed. Nominal debt in that case exacerbates the time inconsistency
problem when the elasticity of substitution is greater than one, since it reinforces the
incentive to inflate, and alleviates it when the elasticity is lower than one. If public
debt is negative, the incentive for the government is to revalue this asset, so that the
‘nominal effect’ works in the opposite direction.
4 Markov-perfect monetary equilibria
In this section we assume that the government cannot commit to a future path of policy
actions, and therefore chooses its monetary policy sequentially. We restrict the analysis
to the case where such sequential choices do not depend on the whole history up to
period t but can depend on the pay-off relevant state variables – as in Markov-perfect
equilibria – and therefore sequential optimal choices are recursively given by stationary
optimal policies. In particular, in the case with nominal debt, government policy is
recursively defined by ct = C(zt) and the corresponding state transition zt+1 = z
′(zt).
Similarly, with indexed debt, government policy is recursively defined by ct = C(bt) and
the corresponding state transition bt+1 = b
′(bt). Agents have rational expectations and
therefore their consumption plans are consistent with government policy choices and the
corresponding state transitions. Our definitions of Markov-perfect monetary equilibria
take these elements into account.
4.1 Indexed debt
Definition 4 A Markov-perfect monetary equilibrium8 with indexed debt is a value func-
tion V (b) and policy functions C(b)and b′(b) such that c = C(b) and b′ = b′(b) solve
V (b) = max
c,b′
{u(c)− α(c+ g) + βV (b′)}
7Ellison and Rankin (2007) show that this possibility of having time consistent optimal policies for
specific initial real liabilities can also occur with indexed debt for some forms of non-CRRA preferences.
8As in economies with full commitment, we assume – and ex-post verify – that the cash-in-advance
constraint is always binding.
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subject to the implementability constraint
C(b′)uc(C(b′))
β
α
+ βb′ = c+ g + b, t ≥ 0.
In order to characterize the Markov-perfect equilibrium, notice that the first order
condition for c is:
uc(c)− α = λ,
and for b′,
Vb(b
′) + λ
(
Cb(b
′)uc(C(b′))
α
(1− σ) + 1
)
= 0.
while the envelope condition is given by
Vb(b) = −λ.
These equations imply the following intertemporal condition along an equilibrium path,
uc(c
′)
α
− 1 =
(
uc(c)
α
− 1
)[
1 +
uc(C(b
′))
α
Cb(b
′) (1− σ)
]
. (21)
It follows that in the log case (σ = 1) the optimal policy is stationary; given any
sustainable level of initial debt b0, the level is maintained and, correspondingly, the
consumption path is constant.
It is also the case that the first best, where uc(c)
α
= 1, is a steady state, independently
of the value of σ. Furthermore, at the first best, where the stationary level of debt is
negative and large enough in absolute value to cover expenditures, an increase in the
level of assets does not affect consumption Cb(b
′) = 0, for b′ ≤ b∗,where b∗ < 0 is the
level of assets corresponding to the first best9
Comparing the equilibrium intertemporal condition of the economy without commit-
ment (21) with the corresponding condition of the economy with full commitment (17),
we see that the ‘intertemporal elasticity effect,’ when σ 6= 1, is weighted by −Cb(b′),
which is the marginal decrease in consumption in response to an increase in debt, as a
function of the level of debt. In the numerical computation of Markov-perfect equilibria,
Cb(b
′) is always negative. With Cb(b′) negative, the intertemporal condition (21) implies
that when σ < 1 the consumption path is increasing, while when σ > 1 the consumption
path is decreasing.
We now turn to the numerical results. In Appendix 2 we discuss the choice of
parameters and describe the computational algorithm. Figure 1 shows the optimal debt
and consumption policies, b′(b) or rather b′(b)− b, and C(b), for σ = 0.6, σ = 1.0, and
σ = 1.4, and for the corresponding relevant ranges of b. As we have already mentioned,
when σ = 1.0 the initial level of debt is maintained forever, i.e. b′(b)− b = 0.
9Technically, there is a need to consider positive transfers, meaning that there is free disposal of
extra revenues by the government (see Appendix 1).
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When σ < 1 the policy function b′(b) is decreasing and b′(b) < b, except at the value
of debt that supports the first-best level of consumption where there is no distortionary
taxation 10. The inflation tax is higher initially so that debt may be depleted and assets
accumulated, to the point where there are enough assets to finance all expenditures,
and the first best is attained.
When σ > 1, the policy function b′(b) is increasing and b′(b) > b, except at the
first-best level of debt b∗ < 0. Furthermore, b
′(b)
b
< β−1, so that debt is accumulated at
a rate lower than β−1− 1. The first best is also a steady state when σ > 1, but it is not
the asymptotic state and therefore the ‘intertemporal elasticity effect’ never disappears.
Panel F also shows that when σ = 1.4, Cb(b
′) is very close to zero. In general, as our
computations have also shown, whenever σ is close to one, Cb(b
′) is very close to zero
and, correspondingly, b′(b) ≈ b. This means that convergence to the first best when
σ < 1, or the accumulation of debt when σ > 1, is very slow.
4.2 Nominal debt
As we have seen, in an economy with full commitment and nominal debt, there is a
‘nominal effect’ since the government has an incentive to partially monetize the debt in
the initial period. In an economy without commitment, this distorting effect is present
in every period and therefore is anticipated by households. As in an economy with full
commitment, the ‘nominal effect’ interacts with the possible ‘intertemporal elasticity
effect’.
Definition 5 A Markov-perfect monetary equilibrium with nominal debt is a value func-
tion V (z) and policy functions C(z) and z′(z) such that c = C(z) and z′ = z′(z) solve
V (z) = max
{c,z′}
{u(c)− α (c+ g) + βV (z′)} (22)
subject to the implementability constraint
C(z′)uc(C(z′))
β
α
+ βz′C(z′) = zc+ c+ g. (23)
To characterize the Markov-perfect monetary equilibrium, notice that the first order
conditions of the problem described above are
uc(c)− α = λ(1 + z)
and
Vz(z
′) + λ
(
Cz(z
′)uc(C(z′))
α
(1− σ) + C(z′) [1 + εc(z′)]
)
= 0,
10Notice that policies show small high-frequency fluctuations due to our discrete grid algorithm. Such
fluctuations do not impinge on our results. Ffor clarity we fit a fourth-order polynomial in Figure 1.
Also see Appendix 2, which provides the values of debt supporting the first best.
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where εc(z) =
zCz(z)
C(z)
is the elasticity of C(z), and the envelope condition is
Vz(z) = −λc.
This implies
uc(c′)
α
− 1
1 + z′
=
uc(c)
α
− 1
1 + z
(
1 + εc(z
′) +
uc(C(z
′))Cz(z′)
αC(z′)
(1− σ)
)
. (24)
For z′ 6= 0, this can be written as
uc(c′)
α
− 1
1 + z′
=
uc(c)
α
− 1
1 + z
(
1 + εc(z
′)
[
1 +
uc(C(z
′))
z′α
(1− σ)
])
. (25)
As in the case with indexed debt, there is a first-best steady state, with uc(c)
α
= 1,
where government assets are enough to finance expenditures. If z ≡ z∗ = −1 − g
(1−β)c∗
with uc (c
∗) = α, the cash-in-advance constraint holds with equality and the solution is
the first best. This is an isolated steady state11.
As we have seen in the previous section, with nominal debt there is another steady
state, where z = −uc(c)
α
(1− σ) , and c solves cuc(c)
α
[1− (1− β)σ] = c+ g.
To better understand the distortions present in the economy with nominal debt
without commitment, it is useful to consider the log case, where the intertemporal
condition (24) can be rewritten as
1
c
− α[
1 + (1+i)B
M
] = 1c′ − α[
1 + (1+i
′)B′
M ′
] [1 + εc((1 + i′)B′
M ′
)]−1
(26)
where the elasticity εc(z
′) is negative and less than one in absolute value (as our com-
putations show).
This intertemporal equation reflects the different distortions present as a result of
debt being nominal and policy decisions being sequential. The term
[
1 + (1+i)B
M
]
re-
sults from the discretionary incentive to reduce the real value of nominal debt. It is
present in the problem with commitment only in the initial period (equation (20)). The
marginal benefit of increasing current consumption is discounted by the current liabili-
ties, (1+i)B
M
, reflecting the fact that higher consumption in the current period implies a
higher real value of outstanding nominal debt and therefore higher future distortionary
taxes. Hence, the benefits of higher consumption today for the benevolent government
must be discounted to take into account these future costs. The term
[
1 + εc
(
(1+i′)B′
M ′
)]
11See Appendix 1 for a more detailed discussion of the case z ≤ −1.
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results from the dynamic nature of this problem and reflects the cost of the time in-
consistency problem being exacerbated in the future, due to an increase in outstanding
liabilities at the end of the current period 12. For σ 6= 1, these two effects are com-
pounded by the ‘intertemporal elasticity effects’ and, as we have seen, the interaction
of all these effects may result in stationary solutions not present in the economy with
indexed debt.
In Figure 2 we report our findings for the same three elasticity values, σ = 0.6,
σ = 1.0, and σ = 1.4, when debt is nominal. We find that in all three cases, z′(z)− z is
decreasing and, as we have shown before, there is a steady state at z = 0 when σ = 1,
z < 0 when σ < 1, and z > 0 when σ > 113. Since z′(z)− z is decreasing, these steady
states correspond to the asymptotic behavior of nominal debt paths.
In contrast with the indexed debt case illustrated in Figure 1, when σ = 1 the stock
of debt is no longer constant, but is progressively depleted until the ‘nominal effect’
disappears at z = 0. When σ < 1, debt is also progressively depleted and assets are
accumulated but, in contrast with the indexed-debt case, this process leads to a level of
assets z which is lower than the first-best steady-state level, since −1 < z < 0 and the
first best would require z < −1.
When σ > 1, debt is not accumulated without bound – as was the case with indexed
debt – but is accumulated or progressively depleted until it reaches the distorted steady
state z > 0 in which the ‘nominal’ and the ‘intertemporal elasticity’ effects cancel out.
As in the indexed-debt case, for σ = 1.4, z′(z)− z is fairly flat and, as a result, long-run
convergence (divergence in the indexed-debt case) is very slow (see Panel E in Figure
2).
5 Welfare comparisons
In the last two sections we have seen how optimal monetary policies may result in differ-
ent time paths for debt and inflation, corresponding to different distortions, depending
on whether monetary authorities can or cannot commit, and whether debt is indexed or
nominal. In this section we address the central question of how these different monetary
regimes compare in terms of welfare.
There is an immediate and unambiguous comparison between economies with and
without commitment with the same type of liabilities (i.e. either indexed or nominal debt
in both economies). As one would expect,Markov-perfect equilibria are less efficient than
full-commitment Ramsey equilibria, unless the initial conditions are such that Ramsey
equilibria are stationary and, therefore, time-consistent. This result follows from the fact
that the full-commitment Ramsey solution is the choice of a sequence of consumption
{ct}∞t=0 which maximizes utility (16) in the set of competitive equilibrium sequences
12Myopic governments that do not take into account the effect of their choices on the state variables
of future government decisions would be solving the problem with only the first term present.
13See Appendix 2 for the corresponding values of z.
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defined either by (15) with indexed debt, or (13) with nominal debt, while the Markov-
perfect equilibrium imposes additional restrictions to this maximization problem: the
optimality of future government decisions. In other words, the Ramsey solution is the
solution of a maximization problem of a committed government in period zero, while the
Markov-perfect equilibrium can be better thought of the equilibrium of a game between
successive governments, in which the optimal plan of the period-zero government has
to take into account the sequential decisions of future governments (or its own future
revised policies).
It is less straightforward to compare economies with different types of liabilities.
Nevertheless, we can compare the welfare of an economy with nominal debt with an
– otherwise identical – economy with indexed debt, provided that both have the same
initial (equilibrium) levels of either real or nominal liabilities.
We compare economies with the same real value of initial liabilities. In economies
with full commitment, if in the indexed-debt economy initial real liabilities are b0, then
in the nominal-debt economy nominal liabilities z0 have to be such that b0 = z0C0(z0),
where C0(z0) is the full-commitment optimal choice of initial consumption in the econ-
omy with nominal debt14. It is then trivial to compare the two economies in terms
of welfare under full commitment. Given that both economies have the same initial
real liabilities b0, a benevolent government accounting for such real liabilities achieves
higher welfare than one which does not, i.e. welfare in the indexed debt economy is
higher than in the corresponding nominal debt economy. We state this formally in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider two economies with full commitment with an initial money
stock M0. One of them has initial nominal debt B0(1+ i0) > 0, and the other has initial
indexed debt b0. Suppose b0 =
B0(1+i0)
P0
, where P0 is the period-zero price in the economy
with nominal debt. Then, the economy with nominal debt always gives lower welfare,
independently of the value of σ.
Proof: The nominal debt economy has initial condition z0 =
B0(1+i0)
M0
, while the in-
dexed economy has initial condition b0 = z0C0(z0), where C0(z0) is the full-commitment
optimal choice of initial consumption in the economy with nominal debt. The opti-
mal solutions in the two economies have to satisfy the same implementability condition.
Taking into account that optimal consumption paths are constant after period zero, this
implementability condition is:
βc1
[
uc(c1)
α
− 1
]
− (1− β) c0 − g = (1− β) b0.
Given this condition, the solution with the highest welfare is the solution with indexed
14If the mapping from b0 to z0 is not unique, we select the lowest z0; however, in our computations
it is unique.
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debt, satisfying
uc(c0)− α = uc(c1)− α(
1− uc(c1)
α
(1− σ)
) ,
since the solution with nominal debt is distorted by z0 (even if there is no ‘unexpected
inflation’; i.e. realized real liabilities are b0) according to
uc(c0)− α
1 + z0
=
uc(c1)− α(
1− uc(c1)
α
(1− σ)
) .
If the solution with nominal debt is different, as when z0 6= 0, then the solution with
nominal debt gives strictly lower welfare
The choice of comparing economies with the same real value of initial liabilities
under full commitment is consistent with how the Markov-perfect equilibria of the two
economies without full commitment should be compared. A Markov-perfect equilibrium,
like any competitive equilibrium, imposes the ‘rational expectations’ condition that
agents have the right expectations regarding future liabilities. In particular, the indexed
economy is characterized by having nominal interest rates adjusting to price changes so
as to guarantee the predetermined value of real liabilities. With nominal debt, real
liabilities are not predetermined, but with rational expectations (and no uncertainty),
ex-post real returns correspond to agents’ ex-ante expected values. In a Markov-perfect
equilibrium, strategies are policies that only depend on the state variable and therefore
such policies do not treat period zero differently. It follows that in a Markov-perfect
equilibrium of an economy with nominal debt, the government has no ‘free lunch’ from
unexpected inflation, even in period zero.
As we have just seen, with full commitment indexed debt is unambiguously more ef-
ficient than nominal debt, when the pure monetization effect is not considered. Without
commitment, along a Markov-perfect equilibrium path, there are no ‘free lunches’. Does
this mean that indexed debt is better than nominal debt? The following proposition
provides an interesting answer to this question.
Proposition 2 Consider two economies without commitment and initial money stock
M0. One of them has initial nominal debt B0(1 + i0) > 0, and the other has initial
indexed debt b0. Suppose b0 =
B0(1+i0)
P0
, where P0 is the period-zero price in the economy
with nominal debt.
(i) If σ = 1, the welfare in the economy with indexed debt is higher than in the
economy with nominal debt.
(ii) If σ 6= 1, the welfare in the economy with nominal debt can be higher or lower
than in the economy with indexed debt, depending on b0.
Part (i) of Proposition 2 follows from previous results. First, in the log case with
indexed debt, policy is time consistent; hence, the full-commitment and the Markov-
perfect equilibria coincide. Second, from Proposition 1, the full-commitment equilibrium
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with nominal debt provides lower welfare than the equilibrium with indexed debt. Third,
as we have seen, the Markov-perfect equilibrium introduces additional constraints to the
full-commitment maximization problem, resulting in lower welfare in the economy with
nominal debt. Therefore, when σ = 1, indexed debt dominates nominal debt in terms
of welfare. Part (ii) of Proposition 2 follows from our numerical simulations, showing
that welfare reversals may occur.
Figure 3 shows that – in spite of the roughness of our discrete choice algorithm –
the value functions are very well behaved; e.g. decreasing and concave in b, and fairly
smooth. This allows for (robust) welfare comparisons, once indexed and nominal debt
value functions take the same domain. Figure 4 illustrates Proposition 2. It compares
the value functions with indexed debt Vi and with nominal debt Vn as functions of
nominal liabilities z; that is, Vi(b(z)), where b(z) ≡ zC(z).
Panels C and D of Figure 4 show the unambiguous result in part (i) of Proposition
2, that, with unitary elasticity, indexed debt dominates nominal debt in terms of wel-
fare. The remaining panels illustrate the result in the second part of Proposition 2. In
particular, when σ 6= 1, there is a range of assets and debts for which nominal debt
Pareto-dominates indexed debt.
There are two effects at play. First, because we compare economies with the same
initial real liabilities, indexed debt tends to give higher welfare than nominal debt. This
is the case under full commitment as stated in Proposition 1, but the effect is also
present in Markov-perfect equilibria. The second effect, which could either compensate
or reinforce the first one, is the magnitude of the dynamic distortions induced by the
time inconsistency.
With σ = 1, Ramsey policy with indexed debt is time consistent, while it is time
inconsistent with nominal debt. In a Markov-perfect equilibrium, nominal debt is de-
pleted to the point where debt is zero and policy is time consistent. Such departure from
stationarity is costly, and as a result indexed debt dominates nominal debt in terms of
welfare, when σ = 1.
If σ 6= 1, Ramsey policy is time inconsistent when debt is indexed, while when
debt is nominal there is a level of nominal debt (or assets) such that policy is time
consistent. In particular, as we have seen, when σ < 1 and z < 0 (or alternatively
when σ > 1 and z > 0), the ‘intertemporal elasticity effect’ and the ‘nominal effect’
tend to mutually offset; in fact both effects fully cancel out at the distorted steady state
z < 0 (alternatively, z > 0). At the distorted steady state z, the elimination of the time
inconsistency distortions more than compensates for the potential dominance of indexed
debt. As a result, welfare is higher with nominal debt. This dominance of nominal
debt is still present in a range of initial debt (or asset) levels close to the distorted
steady states. This follows from the fact that Markov-equilibrium paths converge to
the (nearby) distorted steady state, and therefore the cost of anticipated distortions –
due to ’time inconsistencies’ – is relatively small. In fact, the dominance of nominal
debt can still be present at initial values of debt for which the ‘intertemporal elasticity
effect’ and the ‘nominal effect’ actually reinforce each other; that is for relatively low
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debt values, z > 0, when σ < 1, or for relatively low asset values, z < 0, when σ > 1, as
can be seen Figure 4.
As the intertemporal equilibrium condition (26) shows, the time-inconsistency ’nom-
inal effect’ is exacerbated by the size of z (in absolute value); i.e. by the debt (or asset)
to money ratio. Therefore, for large values of z (in absolute value) the dynamic distor-
tions due to time inconsistency are very costly. It follows that, for high levels of debt
(or assets) relative to money, indexed debt dominates nominal debt in terms of welfare.
When σ < 1, debt depletion is a characteristic of Markov-perfect equilibria with both
indexed and nominal debt. If the initial value of debt is high, the relative advantage of
converging to z < 0, as opposed to the first best, is properly discounted into the distant
future and offset by the more immediate cost of having the ‘nominal effect’ reinforcing
the ‘intertemporal elasticity effect’. Similarly, when σ > 1 and the initial level of debt
is much higher than z > 0, the relative advantage of converging to z > 0 is properly
discounted and offset by the cost of depleting the debt, given that the ‘intertemporal
elasticity effect’ calls for postponing taxation and accumulating debt: a recommendation
that sequential optimal policy follows with indexed debt, but not with nominal debt. It
should also be noticed that a similar effect can happen when σ < 1 and −1 < z < z < 0.
Then the ‘intertemporal elasticity effect’ calls for anticipating taxation and accumulating
assets, while the ‘nominal effect’ calls for a relatively costly process of asset depletion;
as a result, in this case, welfare with indexed debt is higher when assets are high (see
Panel B.)
To summarize we emphasize two points. The first is that we provide an interesting
example of the principle that adding a distortion to a second-best problem can actu-
ally improve welfare. Nominal debt adds a dynamic distortion to the Markov-perfect
equilibrium. In the case where policy is time consistent with indexed debt, adding this
distortion reduces welfare. When policy is time inconsistent with indexed debt, there
are two dynamic distortions, due to the differing elasticities and to nominal debt. In
this case, adding the distortion from nominal debt can actually raise welfare.
The second point has important policy implications. In the calibrated economy with
σ different from one, when debt is relatively high (relative to output) it is better to have
indexed debt, but for moderate levels of debt, it is preferable to have nominal debt, i.e.
it is better to converge to the level of debt associated with the nominal-debt distorted
steady state (positive or negative), rather than have an indefinite accumulation of debt
or its depletion and subsequent accumulation of assets all the way to the first best.
6 Additional taxes
In most advanced economies, seigniorage is a minor source of revenue, and government
liabilities are financed mostly through consumption and income taxes. This raises the
question of whether our previous analysis is still valid when taxes are introduced so as
to make seigniorage only a marginal component of government revenues. An additional
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motivation to introduce taxes in our model is to inquire whether a fully committed
fiscal authority can overrun the commitment problems of a monetary authority. In this
section we address these questions by introducing both consumption and labor income
taxes.
We show first that the introduction of taxes, when the fiscal authority sets taxes one
period in advance, reduces the need to raise revenues through seigniorage but does not
change the characterization of equilibria with respect to the economies without taxes,
analyzed in the previous sections. Our timing assumption is reasonable, taking into ac-
count the different frequencies in which monetary and fiscal decisions are typically made
and implemented. Second, we show that, if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
is not lower than one and there is full commitment on the part of the fiscal authority
(who makes policy choices before the monetary authority does), the fiscal authority can
implement the full-commitment Ramsey solution independently of the degree of com-
mitment of the monetary authority who is constrained to follow the Friedman rule of
zero nominal interest rated. This result applies to both economies with nominal and
indexed-debt.
When the government levies consumption and labor income taxes, the household
problem becomes:
max
∞∑
t=0
βt [u(ct)− αnt] (27)
subject to:
Pt(1 + τ
c
t)ct ≤Mt (28)
and
Mt+1 +Bt+1 ≤Mt − Pt(1 + τ ct)ct +Bt(1 + it) + Pt(1− τnt )nt, (29)
where τ ct , τ
n
t are consumption and labor income taxes respectively, and subject to the
terminal condition: limT−→∞ β
T BT+1
PT
≥ 0.
Now, the marginal conditions (7), (8) and (9) characterizing the households’s optimal
choice become:
uc(ct+1)
α
= (1 + it+1)
1 + τ ct+1
1− τnt+1
(30)
1 + it+1 = β
−1Pt+1
(
1− τnt+1
)
Pt (1− τnt )
(31)
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and
ct =
Mt
Pt(1 + τ ct)
. (32)
These conditions must hold for every t ≥ 0. As in the economies without taxes, the
cash-in-advance constraint (32) is binding as long as uc(ct)/α > 1. However, in contrast
with economies without taxes, uc(ct)/α > 1 does not imply that the nominal interest
rate is positive. The non-negativity of nominal interest rates is an additional restriction
to the implementation.
The sequence of government budget constraints in this economy is now given by
Ptg +M
g
t +B
g
t (1 + it) ≤ Ptτ ctct + Ptτnt nt +M gt+1 +Bgt+1 (33)
while the feasibility conditions (1) do not change.
Define the effective labor income tax as:
τ t =
τ ct + τ
n
t
1 + τ ct
, i.e. (1− τ t) = 1− τ
n
t
1 + τ ct
Then, using the equilibrium conditions (30 - 32), as well as the resource constraint
(1), the intertemporal government budget constraint can be written as the following
implementability condition15
ct+1uc(ct+1)
β
α
+ βzt+1(1− τ t+1)−1ct+1 = ct + zt(1− τ t)−1ct + g, (34)
together with the terminal condition
limT−→∞ β
T cT+1uc(cT+1)
β
α
+ βzT+1(1− τT+1)−1cT+1) = 0.
These implementability conditions compare with (11). The equations are the same,
except that the variable zt in (11) is the variable zt(1− τ t)−1 in (34).
6.1 Optimal monetary policy when the fiscal authority moves one period
in advance
We now consider the case where tax decisions for some period t must be made one period
in advance, and may depend only on the state at t − 1. In this case we can define the
15Notice that M
g
t
Pt(1−τnt ) = ct(1 − τ t)
−1;
Mgt+1
Pt(1−τnt ) =
Mgt+1
Pt+1(1−τnt+1)
Pt+1(1−τnt+1)
Pt(1−τnt ) = ct+1(1 −
τ t+1)−1β(1 + it+1) = ct+1uc(ct+1)βα ;
Bgt (1+it)
Pt(1−τnt ) =
Bgt (1+it)
Mgt
Mgt
Pt(1−τnt ) = ztct(1 − τ t)
−1, and
Bgt+1
Pt(1−τnt ) =
Bgt+1(1+it+1)
Mgt+1
Mgt+1
Pt(1−τnt )(1+it+1) = βzt+1ct+1(1− τ t+1)
−1.
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new state variable ẑt ≡ zt(1 − τ t)−1, and the problems are isomorphic to the problems
in the previous sections, since the implementability condition (34) reduces to
ct+1uc(ct+1)
β
α
+ βẑt+1ct+1 = ct + ẑtct + g, (35)
which is formally identical to (11).
Notice that financing liabilities through taxes reduces the need to use seigniorage,
however this does not mean that distortions are reduced, since uc(ct+1)/α = (1+it+1)(1−
τ t+1)
−1.
Consistent with our framework, we assume that the fiscal authority either sets a
sequence of taxes {τ t}∞t=0 – and commits to it – or defines a recursive strategy for taxes
– from period one on – as a function of the state; i.e. sets τ 0 and τ t+1 = τ(zt). As long
as the nominal interest rates are away from the lower bound of zero nominal interest
rates, the problem for the monetary authority has the same structure as before, and
therefore the same results obtain.
In summary, the monetary authority faces the same problem with pre-determined
taxes on consumption and income as with only seigniorage, for any degree of monetary
commitment. The recursive strategies of the monetary authority C(ẑ) and z′(ẑ)are the
same as in the economy without taxes, as long as nominal interest rates are positive.
Additional taxes with indexed debt. In the economy with indexed debt let
b̂t = bt(1− τnt )−1 =
Bt(1 + it)
Pt(1− τnt )
.
That is, b̂t = ztct(1 − τ t)−1 = ẑtct. Then the implementability condition with indexed
debt can be written as
ct+1uc(ct+1)
β
α
+ βb̂t+1 = ct + b̂tct + g. (36)
With labor taxes set one period in advance, as long as nominal interest rates are pos-
itive, the policy choices C (̂b) and b′(̂b) are the same as in the economy without taxes.
Furthermore, if τnt = 0 then the implementability condition is equivalent to (14) with
b̂t = bt. This means that when there are only consumption taxes, whether these are
decided one period in advance or not, the policy problem and therefore the optimal path
of indexed debt do not change.
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6.2 When the fiscal authority can fully commit
Whenever the discretionary incentive is to have higher current tax (which is the case
with σ ≤ 1), it is possible to set taxes in a way that the resulting monetary policy
follows the full-commitment Ramsey solution with zero nominal interest rates16.
Full-commitment solutions, both with indexed and nominal debt, have the charac-
teristic that consumption is constant from period one on. Let c0, ct = c, t ≥ 1, be the
optimal path of consumption with full-commitment in a given economy. Let taxes be
τ t = τ , t ≥ 1,where
uc(c)
α
= (1 + τ)−1 .
In period zero, the monetary authority has no incentive to deviate from such consump-
tion plan. Consider the choice of the monetary authority at any t ≥ 1. If the incentive
is to delay consumption then, given that the government present value budget con-
straint must be satisfied, there must be some future consumption ct+1+s, s ≥ 0, such
that ct < c < ct+1+s, as long as raising the tax rates raises revenue. However, since
uc(ct+1+s)/α = (1 + it+1+s) (1 + τ)
−1 it must be that it+1+s < 0. Negative interest rates
cannot be an equilibrium in this economy since households would borrow without limit.
It follows that there is no gain in partially monetizing the stock of nominal debt
in any period, and monetary policy can only passively implement the full-commitment
solution of the corresponding nominal or indexed-debt economy17.
Proposition 3 In an economy with either nominal or indexed debt (with ẑ0 or b̂0), as-
sume fiscal authorities maximize the welfare of the representative household and fully
commit to their policies. If σ ≤ 1 then the fiscal authorities can induce the implementa-
tion of the corresponding full-commitment Ramsey equilibrium regardless of the degree
of commitment of the monetary authority.
As we have seen, when σ > 1 the monetary authority has an incentive to reduce the
current price level (i.e. the ‘intertemporal elasticity’ effect may dominate the ‘nominal
debt’ effect) and so in this case the previous argument cannot be applied.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper has discussed the different ways in which nominal and indexed debt affect
the sequential choice of optimal monetary and debt policies. To this purpose, we have
studied a general equilibrium monetary model where the costs of unanticipated inflation
16The Friedman rule is optimal in an economy with cash and credit goods if preferences are separable
in leisure and homothetic in the two consumption goods.
17Marimon, Nicolini, and Teles (2003) make a similar argument in a different context.
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arise from a cash-in-advance constraint with the timing of Svensson (1985), and where
government expenditures are exogenous.
In our environment, as in Nicolini (1998), when the utility function is logarithmic
in consumption and linear in leisure and debt is indexed, there is no time-inconsistency
problem. In this case, the optimal monetary policy is to maintain the initial level of
indexed debt, independently of the level of commitment of a benevolent government.
In contrast, for the same specification of preferences, when the initial stock of govern-
ment debt is nominal, a time-inconsistency problem arises. In this case, the government
is tempted to inflate away its nominal debt liabilities. When the government cannot
commit to its planned policies, to progressively deplete the outstanding stock is part
of an optimal sequential policy. Optimal nominal interest rates in this case are also
decreasing and converge asymptotically.
In the rational expectations equilibria of our economies there are no surprise infla-
tions. Still, for a given initial real value of outstanding debt, the sequential optimal
equilibrium with indexed debt provides higher welfare. In this sense nominal debt can
be a burden on optimal monetary policy.
When we consider CRRA preferences with the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
different from one, it is still true that in a Markov-perfect equilibrium the path of nominal
debt converges to a stationary level of debt. However, it is not zero, but negative or
positive depending on the intertemporal elasticity being greater or lower than one. With
such general preferences, optimal sequential policy is time inconsistent even when debt
is indexed. The interaction of the two sources of dynamic distortions, resulting from the
differing elasticities and from nominal debt, can overturn the above efficiency result and
it may actually be the case that nominal debt provides higher welfare than indexed debt.
In fact, our computations show that, for relatively low values of debt, welfare is higher
when debt is nominal. This is one more illustration of the principle that in a second
best, adding a distortion may actually increase welfare. However, our computations
also show that, for large levels of debt, indexed debt dominates in terms of welfare and
therefore nominal debt is a burden to monetary policy.
The introduction of additional forms of taxation further clarifies the interplay be-
tween the various forms of debt and commitment possibilities. Under the natural as-
sumption that fiscal policy choices are predetermined, we have shown that the optimal
policy problem has the same characterization, provided that the revenues levied through
seigniorage are enough to allow for an optimal monetary policy with non-negative in-
terest rates.
If there is full commitment to an optimal fiscal policy, the fiscal authorities, antic-
ipating monetary policy distortions, may choose to fully finance government liabilities
and – provided the elasticity of substitution is greater or equal to one – the resulting
monetary policy follows the Friedman rule of zero nominal interest rates. Moreover, this
policy results in the equilibrium that obtains in the economy with full commitment with
indexed debt, even if debt is nominal and the monetary authority can not commit.
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Ours is a normative (second-best) analysis that takes into account the commitment
problems which are at the root of institutional design in many developed economies
(such as Central Bank independence, constraints on public indebtness, etc.) As such,
it throws new light on the ways in which the possibility of monetizing nominal debts
can affect monetary policy (a central concern in policy design), and on how optimal
debt and monetary policies should be designed. We do not claim that our results on
optimal-equilibrium debt paths match – or should match – observed data. Still, it is
the case that the prescriptions of our model could be used to provide a more detailed
positive analysis of existing monetary policies and some insights on how monetary and
debt policies should be redesigned if necessary.
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Equilibria with first-best outcomes
In this Appendix we discuss in more detail equilibria with first-best outcomes; in par-
ticular, equilibria where the cash-in-advance constraints may not be binding. To un-
derstand these cases it is enough to consider optimal policies with full commitment.
In these economies, the implementability constraint, assuming that the cash-in-advance
constraint holds with equality and given that optimal consumption is constant from
period t = 1 on, reduces to
β
[
uc(c1)
α
− 1
]
c1 − (1− β)c0 − g = (1− β)x0.
where x0 = b0 if debt is indexed, and x0 = z0c0 if debt is nominal.
Clearly, if initial government assets are large enough for there to be no need to raise
distortionary taxes, the first best is achieved, i.e. c1 = c0 = c
∗, where uc(c
∗)
α
= 1.
Both in economies with nominal and indexed debt, there is a first-best solution
where the cash-in-advance constraint holds with equality in every period, even if it is
not binding. In the indexed-debt economy that will be the case if initial debt is b0 = b
∗ ≡
−c∗ − g
(1−β) , and in the nominal debt economy, if initial debt is z0 ≡ z∗ = −1− g(1−β)c∗ ,
which results in real initial assets b∗ = z∗c∗. When initial assets are larger (b0 < b∗ or
z0 < z
∗), the government transfers to the consumers the redundant assets lump sum in
order to implement the first-best allocation.
With nominal debt, it is possible to implement the first-best allocations for any
z0 < −1, i.e. M g0 + Bg0(1 + i0) < 0, although then the cash-in-advance constraints do
not hold with equality and therefore the implementability conditions cannot be written
as above. By imposing the transversality condition (10), the budget constraint of the
government (12 ) can then be written as
∞∑
t=0
βt+1
it+1M
g
t+1
Pt+1
=
M g0 +B
g
0(1 + i0)
P0
+
g
1− β .
But if M g0 + B
g
0(1 + i0) < 0, there is a price P0, such that the first-best ct = c
∗, for all
t ≥ 0, is achieved. At the first-best, it+1 = 0, t ≥ 0, and therefore
M g0
P0
(1 + z0) = − g
1− β .
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If z0 ∈ (z∗,−1) then M
g
0
P0
> c∗, i.e. the cash-in-advance constraint is not satisfied with
equality. In particular, if 1+ z0 = −ε < 0, with ε→ 0, in order to achieve the first best,
Mg0
P0
→∞ (which means that initial real debt is Bg0 (1+i0)
P0
= −Mg0
P0
− g
1−β → −∞). But this
solution with total assets that are positive but arbitrarily low is not an equilibrium if
anticipated. Indeed from the Fisher equation (8), the nominal interest rate would have
to be negative and approaching −1, as the price level approaches zero. Private agents
would be able to make infinite profits by borrowing at the negative nominal rate and
holding money. As a result, when z0 < −1, but close to −1, there is a first-best full
commitment Ramsey equilibrium, but there is no Markov-perfect equilibrium for z < −1
and close to −1, since the latter imposes that the government policy be anticipated, and
the above incentive to deflate is equally present when there is no commitment.
Finally, the case z0 = −1 also deserves to be discussed. The corresponding full-
commitment Ramsey equilibrium results in a time-inconsistent optimal policy given by
c0 = c
∗ and c1 being the solution to β
[
uc(c1)
α
− 1
]
c1 = g, while zt = −1, for t ≥ 1. A
Markov-perfect equilibrium with z0 = −1 must have c0 = c∗ but z1 > −1, since it is not
possible to have z1 ≤ −1.
Appendix 2. Numerical Exercises
We carry out numerical exercises for three different values of the elasticity of substi-
tution: σ1 = 0.6, σ2 = 1.0, and σ3 = 1.4. To solve our model economies we must
choose numerical values for α, β, and g. These are the same for the different economies.
We assume that the value of β is such that the real interest rate is approximately two
percent. Consequently, β = 0.98.
We take as reference values a constant government expenditure to output ratio of
g/y = 0.01 and a constant debt to output ratio of b/y = 0.8. The reason for the
low expenditure to output ratio is that these are the expenditures to be financed with
seigniorage which is a relatively low share of tax revenues. Since in our model economies
g+ c = y, these choices imply that g/c = 0.01 and b/c = 0.81. Next, we normalize units
so that c = 1 and, therefore g = 0.01 and y = 1.01. To obtain the value of α we use the
implementability condition, (14), with stationary values of consumption and debt:
c−σ
α
=
1
β
[
1 +
g
c
+ (1− β) b
c
]
. (37)
Notice that, given our normalization c = 1, different values of σ result in the same choice
of α; which, given the rest of the parameters, is α = 0.95.
These choices imply that the values of b that support the first best in the economies
with indexed debt are b∗1 = −1.59, b∗2 = −1.55, b∗3 = −1.54. These are obtained by
computing c∗i such that
(c∗i )
−σi
α
= 1, and the corresponding value of b∗i satisfies (37).
The choices of parameters also imply that the distorted steady-state values of z for the
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economies with nominal debt are z1 = −0.429 (corresponding to c1 = 1.05 and b1 =
−0.451), z2 = 0 (corresponding to c2 = 1.02 and b2 = 0), and z3 = 0.419 (corresponding
to c3 = 1.01 and b3 = 0.423). These are obtained using (20) for stationary consumption
and the implementability condition (11) in the steady state, so that
z = −uc(c)
α
(1− σ)
and
cuc(c)
α
[1− (1− β)σ] = c+ g.
Therefore, since (1− β)σ < 1, there is a solution for c and, correspondingly, for z.
Algorithm
Let u(c) = (c1−σ − 1)/(1 − σ). Then to compute the monetary equilibria numerically,
we solve the following dynamic program:
V (x) = max {u(c)− α (c+ g) + βV (x′)} (38)
subject to
β
α
C(b′)1−σ + βb′ = c+ g + b (39)
when x = b and the debt is indexed, or subject to
β
α
C(z′)1−σ + βz′C(z′) = (1 + z)c+ g (40)
when x = z and the debt is nominal.
The Bellman operators associated with these problems are:
Vn+1(x) = T [Vn(x)] = max {u(c)− α (c+ g) + βVn (x′)} (41)
subject to expression (39) when x = b and the debt is indexed, or subject to expres-
sion (40) when x = z and the debt is nominal.
To solve these problems, we use the following algorithm:
• Step 1: Choose numerical values for parameters α, β, σ, and g.
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• Step 2: Define a discrete grid on x (with the first-best level of debt as a lower
bound for the grid with indexed debt, −1 as a lower bound for the grid with
nominal debt as well as for the grid of welfare comparisons, and a large upper
bound, so as to capture an unambiguous welfare ranking across regimes for high
values of debt. This may require a robustness test on the upper bound; see below
how we treat the case σ > 1).
• Step 3: Define a decreasing discrete function Cn(x).
• Step 4: Define an initial discrete function Vn(x) and iterate on the Bellman oper-
ator defined above until we find the converged V ∗(x), x′∗(x), C∗(x).
• Step 5: If C∗(x) = Cn(x), we are done. Otherwise, update Cn(x) and go to Step 3.
The above algorithm must be modified to compute indexed economies with σ > 1
where the level of debt grows (at a rate lower than β−1). In this case we iterate the
above procedure by expanding the upper bound (in Step 2) until successive iterations
do not (significantly) change optimal policies in the relevant range.
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Figure 1: Indexed Debt for various values of σ
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Figure 2: Nominal Debt for various values of σ
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Figure 3: Value Functions for Indexed and Nominal Debt and various values of σ
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Figure 4: Welfare Comparisons for various values of σ
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